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ABSTRACT. Our experience of the qualities Locke classiﬁed as secondary qualities
generates a problem, a version of which Aristotle raised. I call this problem ‘‘the
problem of common sensibles.’’ The problem, as I discuss it, concerns cross-modal
experienced togetherness or unity. On the view that we undergo distinct sense-speciﬁc
experiences as we hear, smell, taste, see, and touch things, there seems no room for
cross-modal unity at the experiential level. But cross-modal unity is real and it
necessitates that we give up the usual separatist view of sense experiences.
In On The Soul (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those
qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are
perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called ‘‘common
sensibles’’. To lllustrate: suppose I am holding a banana. The shape
of the banana is perceptible by my sight and also by my touch; but
the color of the banana is perceptible only via sight. The shape is thus
a common sensible; the color not.
Presumably, Aristotle was willing to allow that qualities that are
not common sensibles are nonetheless sometimes detectable by more
than one sense, as, for example, when I ﬁrst infer a sweet taste in a red
apple apprehended by sight and then experience that taste by biting
into the apple. Aristotles point was that some qualities are not
themselves directly (that is, non-inferentially) given in experience to
multiple senses, qualities like the redness of an apple and the sweet-
ness of its taste, whereas others are so given.
The phenomenon of synthaesthesia may seem to create trouble for
Aristotles position here. PET scans on synaesthetes who are listening
to words show increased blood ﬂow not only in the auditory regions
of their brains but also in brain areas dedicated to visual perception.
The latter is not found in the brains of control groups listening to the
same words (Harrison, 2001). For synaesthetes, it seems, colors are
experienced not only by sight but also by hearing. But synaesthesia,
of course, is an abnormality; and it could reasonably be responded
that Aristotles point is to be taken to apply only to normal perceivers.
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The distinction Aristotle drew between qualities that are common
sensibles and qualities that are not is similar to one drawn later by
John Locke between primary qualities – qualities with an objective,
perceiver-independent nature – and secondary qualities – qualities
whose essences are powers to generate, in normal perceivers, char-
acteristic sense-speciﬁc phenomenological responses. Indeed, one
possible explanation as to why colors, for example, are not common
sensibles is that they are secondary qualities.
This is not the explanation I myself would oﬀer; for I doubt
whether any of the qualities to which the human senses are tuned are
secondary qualities, as understood by Locke. But this does not matter
for my present purposes. Our experience of the qualities Locke
classiﬁed as secondary qualities generates a problem, a version of
which Aristotle himself raised. I shall call this problem the ‘‘problem
of common sensibles.’’
1. THE PROBLEM OUTLINED
Here is one way of illustrating the problem. Let us return to the cases
of the apple and the banana. The apple looks red and the banana
looks yellow. The apple and the banana thereby look diﬀerent colors.
This diﬀerence in their color is given in visual experience. The apple
not only looks red but also tastes sweet. The apple is thereby expe-
rienced as having two diﬀerent qualities. The diﬀerence between
redness and sweetness is as much given in experience as the diﬀerence
between redness and yellowness. But how is this possible? Although
there is a visual experience of redness and a gustatory experience of
sweetness, there is no visual experience of both redness and sweetness
and neither is there a gustatory experience of both these qualities.
How, then, can there be an experience of their difference?
This way of putting the problem is the way Aristotle framed it.
Unfortunately, it is not obviously correct to suppose, as Aristotle
does, that the diﬀerence between sensible qualities, even within a
single sense, is directly presented in experience. Suppose I see both
the apple and the banana at the same time. I am aware of – I
experience – the redness of the apple; likewise for the yellowness of
the banana. But am I aware of – do I experience – the difference in
color between the two? The expression the difference in color is an
abstract noun and abstract nouns following perceptual verbs usually
(though not always) stand in for factive clauses. For example, in
normal contexts to count as seeing the source of the trouble, it does
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not sufﬁce that I see the thing that is in fact the source of the trouble
(a malfunctioning thermostat). I must see that it is the source of the
trouble. Similarly, to be aware of the difference in color of the apple
and the banana, I must be aware that the apple and the banana differ
in color. Arguably, my awareness of the difference in color is merely
a judgement that the apple and banana differ in color on the basis of
my experience of their colors. This is not to say that the judgement is
an inference. The basing relation that connects the judgement to the
color experiences is evidential but it need not be inferential. The point
is rather that the difference in color is not itself directly experienced.
And if this is so, then the problem, as presented above, is based on a
false assumption.
However, the problem need not be formulated in the way that
Aristotle himself did. Instead of focusing on experienced diﬀerence
across senses, we can focus on what we might call ‘‘experienced
togetherness’’.
Suppose that I hear a loud noise and I simultaneously see a yellow
ﬂash. It is not an accurate account of the ﬁrst person perspective to
say simply that I have an auditory experience of something loud and
simultaneously I have a visual experience something yellow. For it is
part of the phenomenology of my experience that the loudness of the
noise and the yellowness of the ﬂash are experienced together
(assuming that the case is a normal one). Their togetherness is as
directly and immediately given to me in my experience as the
togetherness of the redness and roundness of the apples surface. In
the latter case, it does not do justice to the character of my experience
to say merely that I have an experience of a red surface and also an
experience of a round surface. Similarly, in the former. How can this
be? If loudness is experientially trapped in one sense and yellowness
in another, how can the two be experienced together?
One might reply that what I am calling ‘‘experienced togetherness’’
or unity is simply a matter of the relevant experiences being directed
upon the qualities of a single object in a spatially localized region.
This certainly ﬁts with the case of the redness and roundness of the
apple; but it does not accommodate the case of the noise and the
ﬂash. Consider also the following case involving experiences directed
upon widely separated objects. Standing by the railing of a ship
and smelling the sea air, as I look at the ships wake in the ocean, I
hear the sound of a tugboat from afar. Intuitively, it is not simply
that I have an experience of a vivid blue color and also an experience
of a salty smell and further an experience of a booming sound. Color,
smell, and sound are experienced together; there is, as it were,
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a seamless phenomenal whole within which these qualities are
phenomenologically present. Again: how can this be?
A reaction some philosophers may have to these examples is to say
that they should be treated in essentially the same way as the case of
experienced diﬀerence. On this view, the senses deliver up sense-
speciﬁc experiences which then get operated on by the cognitive
faculty. Thought is really what joins the sense-speciﬁc experiences.
This neo-Kantian view seems to me implausible, however. Experience
itself is not phenomenologically fragmented in the way this view
requires. Intuitively, the unity or togetherness is presented in expe-
rience, whatever its subjects can or cannot think. It is certainly true,
of course, that without the relevant concepts, a person cannot rec-
ognize that there is both a loud noise and a yellow ﬂash, for example,
and thus, in these circumstances, he or she is ‘‘blind’’ to the unity in
her experience. But the unity itself is not created by the act of
recognition any more than is the experience.
It should be clear from my remarks thus far that the relation of
experienced togetherness, as I am understanding it, is a phenomenal
relation. There is something it is like to experience the smell of the sea
air, for example; and there is something it is like to experience the
color of the sea; but there is also something it is like to experience
these things together. Moreover, in saying that the relation of expe-
rienced togetherness (or unity or co-presence in consciousness) is
phenomenal, I mean to distinguish it conceptually from spatial unity
(as described in the apple case), neurophysiogical unity (which obtains
just in case the relevant experiences are realized by a single neuro-
physiological mechanism), subject unity (the relata of which are
experienced by the same subject), higher-order subject unity (the relata
of which the subject can self-ascribe as being experienced at a given
time), introspective unity and general attentional unity.
What, then, is the solution to the problem of common sensibles? In
Section 2, I shall propose an answer. Section 3 responds to objec-
tions. The ﬁnal section sketches a view of the phenomenal character
of experience and phenomenal unity which goes naturally with the
proposal made in Section 2.
2. THE PROBLEM SOLVED
The problem of common sensibles is generated initially by an
assumption widely shared in both philosophy and psychology that
the senses function as largely separate channels of information which
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generate diﬀerent sense-speciﬁc impressions or experiences. For
example, I see some ﬂowers, a fence, two squirrels, and in seeing
them, I undergo visual experiences. Listening to a nearby bird sing-
ing, I hear melodious sounds and in so doing, I am the subject of
auditory experiences. Finding a broken egg on the ground, and
smelling its pungent odor, I experience olfactory experiences. Placing
a chocolate in my mouth and tasting its sweetness, I have gustatory
experiences. Running my ﬁngers over the bark of a tree and feeling its
roughness, I experience tactual experiences.
According to this view, if I am using all ﬁve of my senses at a given
time, I undergo ﬁve diﬀerent simultaneous perceptual experiences at
that time, each with its own distinctive sense-speciﬁc phenomenal
character. Since there is in this picture as yet no place for experiences
that encompass multiple secondary qualities (or so-called ‘‘secondary
qualities’’) associated with diﬀerent senses, we may now naturally be
puzzled as to how we can experience such qualities together.
Aristotles own solution was to say that the picture is incomplete:
in addition to the sense-speciﬁc faculties, there is a faculty of common
sense. Using this faculty, perceivers are able to make cross-modal
comparisons between qualities such as redness and sweetness. Ex-
actly, what Aristotle had in mind here is not clear; but his thought
may well have been that in addition to the sense-speciﬁc experiences
generated by the use of the ﬁve senses, there is a further overarching
experience of qualities that are not common sensibles generated by
the faculty of common sense. This experience forms the basis for
cross-modal comparisons between such qualities.
Note that the overarching experience cannot just be a conjunction
of the ﬁve modality-speciﬁc experiences. The conjunction of two
experiences isnt itself an experience at all. The overarching experi-
ence must be a new experience, one that uniﬁes the qualities experi-
enced via diﬀerent senses into a single phenomenological whole.
One obvious question that faces the above proposal concerns the
nature of the overarching experience in relation to the other experi-
ences.1 There is also a further question as to whether, once the move
has been made to introduce a common experience, there remains any
need to countenance the sense-speciﬁc experiences too. Let me explain.
Consider the following example (from Parsons, 1972). Suppose
that this statement is true:
(S) Jones writes illegibly and Jones writes painstakingly.
It does not follow that
(S*) Jones writes illegibly and painstakingly
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is true, at least on one natural reading of (S*). For if Jones writes
illegibly but not painstakingly with his left hand and painstakingly
but legibly with his right, then (S) is true but (S*) false. In this case,
there is an event of Jones writing illegibly and there is an event of
Jones writing painstakingly, but these are two distinct events. There
is no event of Jones writing both illegibly and painstakingly. So, (S)
does not entail (S*), but (S*) clearly does entail (S). Given the event
of Jones writing both illegibly and painstakingly, there is, of course,
the event of Jones writing illegibly. For the latter is the very same
event as the former under a less broad description. Likewise for the
event of Jones writing painstakingly.
In the case where (S*) is true, there is a kind of unity to Jones
writing. Illegibility and painstakingness are combined together in a
single instance of writing. That unity is lacking in the case that (S) is
true and (S*) is false. But where (S*) is true, there arent two diﬀerent
writings, one painstaking and the other illegible, which somehow are
uniﬁed together to produce a third, overarching writing that includes
them. There is just one writing that may be described in more or less
encompassing ways.2
Here is another example. Suppose it is lunchtime and I have a sudden
and strong desire for a pint of beer with a ham sandwich. In having this
desire, of course, I haveadesire forapintofbeer. It is also true that I have
a desire for a ham sandwich. But patently I dont have three sudden
desires here.Nor is it the case that having a desire for a beer togetherwith
a desire for a hamsandwich just is having a desire for a pint of beerwith a
ham sandwich. I might want a beer and also want a ham sandwich while
ﬁnding the idea of having the two together repellent.
My sudden desire for a pint of beer with a ham sandwich is a single
desire that can be described in multiple ways. The description ‘‘desire
for a pint of beer’’ is incomplete, but unlike the description ‘‘desire
for a pint of beer alone’’, it is not inaccurate.
These remarks apply mutatis mutandis, I want now to suggest, to
the problem of common sensibles. There arent ﬁve diﬀerent or sep-
arate simultaneous experiences somehow combined together to gen-
erate a further uniﬁed experience. To be sure, if I am witnessing a
yellow ﬂash and a loud noise, the statement
(S!) I have an experience of a yellow ﬂash and I have an experience of a loud noise
is true. And, given that the case is a normal one, the following is true
too:
(S#) I have an experience of a yellow ﬂash and a loud noise.
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Moreover, (S#) entails (S!). But there is just one experience here, an
experience that can be described less fully as my experience of a
yellow ﬂash or as my experience of a loud noise.
On this view, there really are no such entities as purely visual
experiences or purely auditory experiences or purely olfactory experi-
ences, etc in normal, everyday consciousness. Where there is experi-
enced togetherness across sense modalities, sense-speciﬁc experiences
do not exist. They are the ﬁgments of philosophers and psychologists
imaginations. And there is no problem, thus, of connecting these
experiences up with an overarching experience. There are no sense-
speciﬁc experiences to be connected. There is just a single multi-modal
experience, describable in more or less rich ways. The problem of
common sensibles now dissolves.
3. OBJECTIONS TO THE ONE EXPERIENCE VIEW
‘‘Stuﬀ and nonsense’’, you may say. ‘‘The proposal is empirically
false. Visual experiences are known to arise in the visual cortex,
auditory experiences are known to arise in the auditory cortex, and so
on. In the case of a winetaster, say, who sees and smells and tastes a
wine, it is surely undeniable that visual experiences are tokened in the
winetasters visual cortex, as he views the wine he is tasting, experi-
ences of just the same phenomenal type as those that would have been
tokened in that cortex, had the situation been the same but his other
senses blocked from any information. Of course, these experiences
exist!’’
By way of reply, let us for a moment indulge in the ﬁction that
there are purely visual experiences in everyday consciousness of the
external world. In these experiences, shape and color are uniﬁed. If,
for example, I view a green square, my visual system represents the
greenness and the squareness in separate places in the brain; but these
qualities arent experienced as separate. They are experienced as
qualities of a single thing. I have an experience that is object-uniﬁed,
as we might say, even though its physical basis is disuniﬁed.3 What is
the relationship between the experience and its physical basis? The
answer I favor is that the experience, assuming there is one, is con-
stituted by a certain combination of separate and largely independent
physical events in the visual cortex, but it is not token identical with
that combination. This answer gives the experience a physical nature;
moreover constitution is the relation that bonds macro-events and
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micro-events, macro-states and micro-states, macro-objects and
micro-objects generally.
Consider, for example, a single cloud in the sky. The cloud is an
aggregate of water droplets. The ‘‘is’’ in the last sentence is not the
‘‘is’’ of identity. The cloud in the sky could survive the loss of a few
of its constituent water droplets (if, say, a highly localized strong
gust of warm air were to cause them to evaporate). Not so any
aggregate of water droplets that contains them. The loss of those
droplets would destroy the original aggregate. So, the cloud has a
modal property the aggregate of water droplets lacks, that of possibly
surviving the loss of such-and-such droplets. It follows by Leibniz
Law that the cloud is not identical with any aggregate of droplets. In
general, ordinary, everyday macro-objects are not identical with
aggregates of their parts, since the former diﬀer in their modal
properties from the latter. My car, for example, might have had a
diﬀerent carburettor, but the aggregate of its actual parts could not
have failed to contain the actual carburettor. The car, thus, is not
identical with the sum of its parts. The relationship rather is one of
constitution or composition.
One need not resort to modal properties to make the above points.
Actual properties will do in some cases. The clay that constitutes a
pot exists before the pot does. The lump of silver that is melted and
formed into a coin exists before the melting process, but the coin does
not. The clay is thus not identical with the pot; the lump of silver not
identical with the coin.
Likewise for macro-events. Consider the eruption of Mount
Vesuvius. Intuitively, that very eruption might have spewed forth an
imperceptibly smaller amount of lava.Had it done so, themicro-events
taking place in the spatial region of Vesuvius eruption would have
been minimally diﬀerent and thus the aggregate of those events in that
counterfactual situation is not the same as the actual aggregate. The
eruption, therefore, has amodal property that the underlying cluster of
micro-events lacks, and the former is not identical with the latter.
Alternatively, consider all the micro-physical events that compose
the emergence of North America (Burge, 1986). Imagine that these
events are embedded within a much larger land mass, so that in the
counterfactual situation there is no such thing as North America and
its emergence. Then the aggregate of micro-events has the property of
possibly existing without North America; but the event of North
Americas emerging does not. That event is not identical with the
aggregate. The aggregate constitutes the emergence of North America
in actual fact, but the relationship is not one of identity.
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Consider next the following example. A large chunk of clay is used
to make a statue at time t. The clay constitutes the statue without
being identical with it. Suppose counterfactually that at time t, where
t is later than t, an artist cleverly removes much of the clay without
remolding it so as to leave behind a small clay pot. In the counter-
factual situation, the clay that remains constitutes a pot at t. But in
the actual situation it does not. In actual fact, no clay is removed.
There is, in actual fact, no tiny pot within the statue. There is only the
statue.
Within the aggregate of lumps of clay composing the statue, there
is a smaller aggregate of clay lumps that in a certain counterfactual
situation composes a pot. In actual fact, the smaller aggregate does
not compose a pot. Indeed, it does not by itself actually compose or
constitute any ordinary thing. Rather that aggregate together with
the remaining aggregate form a larger aggregate that composes the
statue.
I hope that the relevance of all of this is becoming clear. On my
view, at the given time the winetaster mentioned above is subject to
a single experience that represents the color of the wine, the smell of
the wine, the taste of the wine, etc. This experience is constituted by
a combination of largely independent physical events going on in
separate regions of the brain. Within that combination of events,
there is a cluster of events (call it ‘‘C’’) occurring in the winetasters
visual cortex. In the extraordinary counterfactual situation in which
the winetasters nonvisual senses are all blocked, so that no non-
visual information gets in, the winetaster is left with a purely visual
experience. And in that counterfactual situation, C, in the absence
of the other pertinent actual physical events, constitutes a visual
experience. But it does not follow from this that in actual fact C
constitutes a purely visual experience. In actual fact, C (wholly)
constitutes no experience at all. There is just one experience the
winetaster undergoes, and C, in conjunction with the relevant events
in other parts of the brain, e.g., the olfactory cortex, etc, constitutes
that.4
Perhaps it will be replied that in the example of the statue and the
pot, the aggregate of lumps of clay that counterfactually constitutes
the pot is in the actual world a purely arbitrary part of the statue,
with nothing to mark it out from any number of other arbitrary parts
of the statue. However, the cluster of physical events I have labeled
‘‘C’’, is a nonarbitrary part of the relevant totality of physical events,
a token of a physical type with a deﬁnite functional role, namely to
generate a conscious visual experience with a certain visual unity.
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This begs the question. I grant that C is a token of a physical type
P whose role in a normally functioning brain is to endow the con-
scious experience of the subject with a visual phenomenology. But
that is certainly compatible with denying that Ps role is to generate in
the brain a token experience with an exclusively visual phenome-
nology. To suppose that Ps role is the latter is to take for granted the
truth of the view I am opposing.
Furthermore, the fact that C is a nonarbitrary part of the whole
combination of physical events constituting the experience is not to
the point. Suppose events E1 and E2 together actually constitute
event F. Suppose E1 could have occurred without E2 and further that
had E1 done so, it would have (wholly) constituted event G. Still, this
is no guarantee that E1 actually constitutes G. For example, my arm
and hand movement relative to Smith and Smiths arm and hand
movement relative to me constitute a certain ﬁght. Smiths movement
might have occurred without my movement. Had it done so, it would
have constituted an act of aggression on the part of Smith. But in
actual fact that act of aggression does not exist. In actual fact, Smiths
arm and hand-movement relative to me is a counterpunch; for I hit
Smith ﬁrst.
Thus, just as Smiths arm and hand movement might have con-
stituted an act of aggression although in reality it does not, so too the
cluster of events, C, might have constituted a purely visual experience
but in reality it does not.
Suppose now that the counterfactual situation I have envisaged for
C becomes a reality. As the winetaster tastes the wine, some extraor-
dinary neural malfunction causes the events other than C that con-
stituted the winetasters experience prior to the malfunction to cease.
Before the malfunction, on the proposed view, C does not constitute a
purely visual experience. After the malfunction, it does. This, it may be
charged, is strange. Why the radical change in what C does?
The answer, as earlier, is that there is no change. But before and after
the malfunction, C does the same thing: it endows the conscious
experience of the subject with a visual phenomenology. The difference
is that before themalfunction, the experience of the winetaster does not
have a purely visual phenomenology; after the malfunction, it does.
Consider next the following example. Suppose I hear a conversa-
tion on my left, as I look at a bed of roses laid out in front of me.
Intuitively, my auditory experience C that very experience C could
have occurred without my visual experience. On my account,
however, that isnt possible. So much the worse, it may be said, for
my account!
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Too fast, I reply. When I try to attend to my auditory experience
via introspection, what I actually come across are the sounds and the
auditory qualities the experience represents. By being aware of those
sounds, I am aware that I am undergoing an auditory experience. But
I am no more aware of the token vehicle of that content than I am of
a burglary when, upon returning home, I see signs of a forced entry
on the front door of my house. My experience thus is transparent to
me (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995, 2000).
If this is correct, then it is not intuitively clear that my auditory
experience could have occurred without my visual experience. The
sounds I experience could have existed without my visual experience
of the roses. Moreover, I certainly could have undergone an experi-
ence that represented those sounds (or sounds just like them) without
also representing the colors and shapes of roses. But it is, of course,
perfectly compatible with these claims that I am the subject of just
one experience, an experience that is audio-visual in character.
What if my auditory experience goes on longer than my visual
experience? Then, it may be urged, my auditory experience has a
temporal property my visual experience lacks, and there cannot be a
single experience after all.
I grant that I can experience a sound that continues, in my
experience, after I experience anything visually. But this is all in the
content of the experience. Initially, what I experience is that a sound
with a certain pitch and loudness is accompanied by a certain color
and shape. As time goes on, the experienced content changes. No
longer is any shape or color represented. The sound is represented on
its own. This certainly shows that the represented sound is not the
same as the represented shape or color. But it does not show that
there is more than a single experience at a time.
I do not deny, of course, that diﬃcult questions arise concerning
the individuation of experiences through time. Is the experience I
undergo initially – an experience with an audio-visual content – the
same as the experience I undergo after the color and shape cease? Is
there one experience here with a less rich content through time? Or is
the audio-visual experience replaced by a second purely auditory
experience, phenomenally just like the ﬁrst in its auditory dimension?
Hard questions of individuation through time arise for everyone,
however. I shall not discuss them here.
Let me quickly mention one ﬁnal worry. Seeing something entails
the presence of a visual experience. I cannot see X unless X looks
some way to me; and for X to look some way to me, it must cause in
me a visual experience. However, on the account I am adopting, in
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normal cases, when I see something, my experience isnt really
properly classiﬁed as visual at all.
It is indeed true that X cannot look some way to person P unless
X produces in P an experience with a visual phenomenology. But
the phenomenology of Ps experience need not be purely or exclu-
sively visual. It can be partly auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and
tactual too. If a visual experience is understood to be an experience
with a visual phenomenology, then, as I see something, I am subject
to a visual experience. Its just that that very experience has a
phenomenology that is auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual
as well.
4. FURTHER ISSUES: PHENOMENAL CHARACTER AND PHENOMENAL
UNITY
Those who think of the phenomenal character of an experience –
what it is like to undergo the experience – as a quality of the expe-
rience think of phenomenal unity or togetherness as a relation
between experiences, a binding relation that uniﬁes sense-speciﬁc
experiences into an overarching maximal experience. This is not how
I think of phenomenal unity. The core intuition, lost in the usual way
of understanding phenomenal unity and emphasized earlier in this
essay, is that, in normal cases, simultaneously experienced perceptual
qualities C the loudness of a sound, the smoothness of a surface, the
sweetness of a taste, the pungency of a smell C are experienced to-
gether and thus are phenomenologically uniﬁed. These qualities are
not qualities of experiences. They are qualities that, if they are
qualities of anything, are qualities of things experienced. Phenomenal
unity or togetherness is a relation between qualities represented in
experience, not between qualities of experiences.
Where phenomenal unity obtains, perceptual experience is closed
under conjunction with respect to the uniﬁed qualities. Thus, in the
case in which the loudness of a sound is phenomenally uniﬁed for
person P with the brightness of a ﬂash of light, the statements
P has an experience of a loud sound
and
P has an experience of a bright ﬂash
jointly entail
P has an experience of a loud sound and a bright ﬂash.
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When there is disunity, perceptual experience is not closed in this
way. Cases of simultaneous phenomenal disuniﬁcation all involve
multiple perceptual experiences at a time and multiple experiential
contents. Such cases are highly abnormal. Where they occur, as, for
example, with split brain patients, there are simultaneously experi-
enced perceptual qualities entering into diﬀerent contents (each of
which is a content experientially represented by the relevant subject at
the given time).5
Here is not the place for a full account of phenomenal unity; but
very brieﬂy my view is that phenomenal unity is a matter of the
simultaneously experienced perceptual qualities entering into the
same phenomenal content. The perceptual experience a normal per-
ceiver undergoes has an enormously rich, multi-modal representa-
tional content — a content which, insofar as it is distinctively
experiential, is nonconceptual, abstract, and appropriately poised.6
This content is the phenomenal content of the experience. It is present
not only in veridical cases but also in cases of illusion and halluci-
nation. It is this content that endows the experience with its
phenomenal character (Tye, 1995, 2000).
Interestingly, the case of split brain patients provides the basis for
an argument that the relation of phenomenal unity is non-transitive,
and this in turn lends further support to the account I am suggesting
of phenomenal unity. I want now in closing to elaborate upon this
point.
The operation of cutting the corpus callosum (a large strand of
neurons connecting the left and right hemispheres of the brain) was
originally performed by Roger Sperry in the 1960s on some epileptic
patients, with the aim of controlling epileptic seizures. It had a
remarkable consequence. In addition to reducing greatly the number
and intensity of the seizures themselves, it also produced a kind of
mental bifurcation in the epileptic patients.
Here is an illustration. A subject, S, is told to stare ﬁxedly at the
center of a translucent screen which ﬁlls his visual ﬁeld. Two words
are ﬂashed onto the screen by means of a projector located behind,
one to the left of the ﬁxation point and one to the right, e.g., the
words ‘‘pen’’ and ‘‘knife’’. The words are ﬂashed very quickly (for
just 1/10 of second) so that eye movements from one word to the
other are not possible. This arrangement is one that ensures that
the word on the left provides input only to the right hemisphere of the
brain and the word on the right provides input only to the left.
S is then asked what he saw. S shows no awareness, in his verbal
responses, of ‘‘pen’’. However, if S is asked to retrieve the object
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corresponding to the word he saw from a group of objects concealed
from sight, using his left hand alone, he will pick out a pen while
rejecting knives. Alternatively, if S is asked to point with his left hand
to the object corresponding to the word he saw, he will point to a pen.
Moreover, if S is asked to sort through the group of objects using
both hands, he will pick out a pen with his left and a knife with his
right. In this case, the two hands work independently with the left
rejecting the knives in the group and the right rejecting the pens.
Once the corpus callosum is cut, the two hemispheres are not
wholly divorced from one another; for the sub-cortical pathways still
link the two. For example, if a pornographic picture is presented only
to the right hemisphere, the subject reports feeling diﬀerently. ‘‘Thats
quite a machine youve got there,’’ one split brain patient remarked.
Since verbal responses are controlled by the left hemisphere, infor-
mation about the picture is evidently getting there. In another
experiment, the subject saw, with his right hemisphere only, a picture
of a frightening scene of a ﬁre. Afterwards, he commented, ‘‘I dont
really know what I saw; I think just a white ﬂash. Maybe some trees,
red trees like in the Fall. I dont know why, but I feel kind of scared. I
feel jumpy. I dont like this room, or maybe its you guys getting me
nervous.’’ Again, what seems to have happened is that the emotion
triggered by the right hemisphere had an eﬀect, via the brainstem, on
the verbal left hemisphere.
The sub-cortical pathways in the brainstem also are responsible
for the experience of touch around the neck and on the head. For
example, if a split brain patient is asked to say where a pin is gently
pricking him on his neck or face, he will report its location accurately.
If asked to touch his left foreﬁnger to the relevant spot after the pin
has been removed, again he will do so accurately. Here, the split brain
patients behavior is just the same as that of a normal subject. And
just as the verbal and nonverbal reponses of the normal subject are
evidence for the experience of a pin prick in a certain location, so too
are those of the split brain subject.
Imagine now that as the neck of the split brain subject, S, is
pricked, he is presented with a red screen to the left, which he touches
with his left foreﬁnger, and a green screen on the right, which he
touches with his right foreﬁnger. S has an experience of his left
foreﬁnger together with a red surface. He also experiences that fore-
ﬁnger as connected to his wrist and his arm; and he experiences his
arm as connected to his neck, in which he experiences the prick. The
same is true for S s right foreﬁnger, except that now the relevant
surface is the green one. S, thus, experiences the redness of the surface
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and the pricking of the pin together. They are phenomenally uniﬁed in
his experience. Likewise, S experiences the greenness of the other
surface and the pricking of the pin together. They also are phe-
nomenally uniﬁed in his experience. But redness and greenness are not
experienced together. They are not phenomenally uniﬁed. Accord-
ingly, phenomenal unity is not transitive: there are cases in which A is
uniﬁed with B, B is uniﬁed with C, but A is not uniﬁed with C. How is
this to be accounted for?
Within the general framework elaborated above, the explanation
is straightforward. S has two multimodal experiences, E1 and E2. E1
represents the pinprick in Ss neck, his left arm, ﬁngers and the sur-
face his left foreﬁnger is touching. E2 represents the pinprick in Ss
neck, his right arm, ﬁngers and the surface the right foreﬁnger is
touching. The pricking is phenomenally uniﬁed with redness by their
entering into the same phenomenal content C the phenomenal con-
tent of E1. The pricking is phenomenally uniﬁed with greenness in like
manner, but this time the common content is the phenomenal content
of E2. Since S has no experience whose phenomenal content has
entering into it both greenness and redness, the two colors are not
phenomenally uniﬁed.
There is thus no more mystery attaching to the non-transitivity of
phenomenal unity than there is to the non-transitivity of the relation of
entering into the same thought content. Just as I can consciously think
that Ann loves Paul and also consciously think that Paul is a neighbor
of Raoul without having any conscious thought into whose content
Ann and Raoul enter, so I can experience A uniﬁed with B and also
experienceB uniﬁed withCwithoutmy experiencingA andC together.
It is not easy to see how the non-transitivity of the phenomenal
unity relation is to be explained on alternative accounts. Those who,
in opposition to the view I have proposed, think of unity or togeth-
erness as a relation between experiences will apparently have to say
that non-transitivity is a primitive feature of the relation. But brute
facts such as this are surely to be avoided wherever possible. Alter-
natively, it might be argued that the case just adumbrated does not
suﬃce to show non-transitivity on the grounds that there are actually
two simultaneous token experiences of the pin prick in the neck. One
of these experiences is uniﬁed with the experience of a green surface
and the other with the experience of a red one.
The biggest diﬃculty here, leaving aside the point that unity, or so I
have claimed, is not a relation between experiences at all, is that there is
no more reason to postulate two token, phenomenally identical expe-
riences of the relevant region of the neck of the split brain subject than
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there is to make such a postulation for any subject. Just as the latter
postulation for normal minds is unmotivated, unnecessarily complex,
and perhaps even incoherent (depending on how token experiences are
individuated), so too is the former. Much better to take the case pre-
sented at face value and give up what is, from the present perspective, a
purely dogmatic adherence to transitivity.
NOTES
1 For diﬃculties that arise here, see Tye (2003).
2 Not everyone accepts this claim. On the view of events elaborated by Jaegwon Kim
(1976) and Alvin Goldman (1970), the event of x’s F-ing G-ly is a complex entity
consisting of x and the property of F-ing G-ly. This has the consequence that at the
time at which (S2) is true, there are four relevant simultaneous events: Jones’ writing
painstakingly and illegibly, Jones’ writing painstakingly, Jones’ writing illegibly and
Jones’ writing. Intuitively, however, events do not individuate in this hyper-ﬁne-
grained way.
3 I am not suggesting here that object-unity is the same as phenomenal unity. See
earlier, Section 2.
4 In my view, there is a maximality constraint on experiences just as there is on
clouds and statues and pictures. Consider a visual experience of a scene S. It is
generally agreed that this does not contain many token visual experiences of parts of
S. Why treat the multi-modal case any diﬀerently?
5 For a discussion of split brains, see Tye (2003, ch. 5). In my view, it is a mistake to
suppose that the perceptual consciousness of split brain subject is always divided
after the commissurotomy. Indeed, it is a mistake to suppose that even in the highly
specialized circumstances in which split brain subjects typically behave anomalously,
their consciousness is invariably divided.
6 For an elucidation of what it is for a content to be nonconceptual, abstract, and
poised, see Tye (1995, 2000). For further critical discussion and replies, see the
web symposium on Tye (2000) at http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/ﬁeld/
tyesymp.htm.
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